| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | ✅ |
DO NOT open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, please report security issues to: security@ribose.com
- Description of the vulnerability.
- Steps to reproduce.
- Potential impact.
- Affected version(s) (run
rnp::version_string()). - Your name/handle (optional, for acknowledgment).
- Initial response: within 48 hours.
- Status update: within 7 days.
- Resolution target: within 30 days (critical), 90 days (others).
This crate wraps librnp (a C++ OpenPGP implementation) via Rust unsafe
FFI bindings. The safe wrappers in src/*.rs are designed so callers
never need to write unsafe code. Bugs in the unsafe blocks are
treated as security issues.
If you find a way to trigger a panic, out-of-bounds read, or use-after-free through the safe API, please report it privately.
SecretString zeroises its underlying bytes on drop
via rnp_buffer_clear (a foreign call the compiler can't optimise
away). Use it for any short-lived secret material.
The request_password helper returns SecretString by default.
Callers who need a plain String can use SecretString::into_string
(but should prefer keeping the secret scoped).
--features pqc and --features crypto-refresh enable experimental
RFC 9580 features that require librnp to be built with the matching
CMake options. The runtime probe
librnp_supports_pqc() confirms the linked librnp
actually supports PQC at runtime; calling PQC APIs without that
confirmation fails opaquely.
librnp uses Botan or OpenSSL as its crypto backend. Reported CVEs in
those backends affect rnp-rs indirectly — see the upstream
SECURITY.md for the
full backend chain.
- CVE-2025-13470 (librnp, fixed in 0.18.1): PKESK session keys were generated without cryptographically random values. rnp-rs 0.1.0 links against a fixed librnp by default; older librnp installs are vulnerable. Mitigation: upgrade librnp to >= 0.18.1.